Kit Fine, in his essay Essence and Modality, claims that essence should be understood as “real definition”, rather than the contemporary trend towards a modal understanding. While Fine’s argument against reducing essence to modal terms is strong, his discussion of essence as real definition appears to be the beginning of a fuller exploration. Fine writes: “If I am right, there is more to the idea of real definition than is commonly conceded. For the activities of specifying the meaning of a word and of stating what an object is are essentially the same; and hence each of them has an equal right to be regarded as a form of definition.” What more there is to the idea of real definition will be explored here. In particular, we will see that if essence is understood as a relation between properties and kinds, then two conceptions of essential properties arise.
Rather than start by discussing how essence is traditionally apposed to accident, lets consider how we use the term “essence” grammatically. This will help clarify how essence is definitional. Now, when we claim that something is essential, we can always meaningfully ask, “essential to what?” This suggests essence is a relation between two terms, because stating that a single term is essential is not enough to provide a meaningful statement. For example, the statement “Love is essential” is incomplete unless context or further statements clarify what love is essential to. Even taking the phrase to mean “Any object which exists must love”, or the like, love is taken as essential to existing, and thus bears the essence relation to existence (although this seems to take existence as a property). As such, essence will be understood as a relation here out.
Given that essence is a relation, what is it a relation between? The etymology of the word provides clues. Essence in Greek literally means “what it is for a thing to be”. In this phrasing, there is a “thing”, the “what” of the thing, which is also the “what” needed for the thing “to be”. Now, assuming that being is different than existence in that the thing can’t merely “be” like existing, but must “be” something, the third term of importance in essence is this something.
These terms may be identified in a concrete example. Consider the claim “Descartes being minded is essential to Descartes being human.” The “thing” in this proposition is Descartes, or perhaps more accurately, the object designated by the name “Descartes”. “Being minded” is a property of Descartes, but also importantly is a property related to “being human” in a certain way. Finally, the “something” in this claim is “being human”. Descartes’ mindedness is related to Descartes’ being human by the “essential” operator.
Note that in some ways, the mindedness being Descartes’, and the being human being Descartes’ are unimportant in that they distract from what is perhaps the central claim “being minded is essential to being human”. However, this later claim is misrepresentative in that it leaves out the tie between objects like Descartes. Allowing the symbol “Es” to stand for Essential, we might represent such a claim as Es (m, h). Again, this is misrepresentative, for it leaves out the “thing” for which the “m” is the “what” represents. A better interpretation of the claim is Es[ m(x), h(x)], (where x=x) for it captures the fact that mindedness is an object’s mindedness, and that humanity is an object’s humanity. This better allows us to consider situations where an object is minded, but not human, and vice versa.
Generalizing from these observations, we could say that essence is, or can be, a relation between properties of objects, not just objects themselves. Further, to give a name to the something, we can say that essence ranges over “kinds”, or perhaps more traditionally, “natures”. Ignoring grammar, we might say that a kind or nature is something that an object “be”. Given the relationship between certain properties to a kind, i.e. that some properties are essential to a kind, terming these certain properties “attributes” will help keep things clarified. Given a proposition of the form “P(a) is essential to K(a)”, P(a) is the attribute, and K(a) is the kind. Note that P(a) should be considered an attribute relative to K(a). Also, the phrase “B’s essence is A” is taken to be equivalent to “A is essential to B”. (Further, as is suggested by the latter phrasing, the essence relationship ranges over quantified properties.)
Understanding essence as a relation between an object’s attributes and an object’s kind allows us to understand more how essence can be thought of as a definition. For a kind and its attributes share the same form as a term and its constituents. The suggestion is that like how the terms “unmarried” and “man” together provide what “bachelor” means, attributes could collectively provide an account of what it is to be some kind. Now, while some philosophers object to the idea of defining an object, we may at least preliminarily avoid these worries by suggesting that real definition is not defining an object, but of defining a kind, which is a way objects “be”.
Using traditional definitions as our guide, let’s try to extend the notion of a real definition. As a starting point we’ll reflect that to define a bachelor as a bachelor is not to give a false definition, but an uninformative definition. Let’s assume that the same is true of essence, given essence’s parallel to meaning. If this is correct, then any claim that “being a kind K is essential to being a kind K” is true, yet does little to extend our understanding of “being a kind K”. To make our bachelor definition informative, we in a sense break the meaning of bachelor down into parts which collectively provide the same meaning as bachelor. We say a bachelor is an unmarried man. Of course, we can also further our understanding by giving definitions of unmarried and of man, the definitions of which collectively taken would provide a more specified account of ‘bachelor’s meaning. If this parallel extends to essence then, an essence claim either specifies wholly or in part what it is to be a certain kind of thing. Attributes of a kind play the role of the terms ‘unmarried’ and ‘man’ in specifying what it is to be a certain kind of thing.
Besides specifying in part what it is to be of some kind, attributes are also of interest because the possession of an attribute by an object is explained by the object being of a kind who is constituted in part by that attribute. More mundanely: we use the fact that an object has a certain nature, or is of a certain kind, to explain why the object is as it is. To the question, “Why is Fido howling at the moon”, we might answer “Because he’s a dog”. Fido being a dog is relevant because presumably, part of what it is to be a dog is to howl at the moon. Here, an object’s nature is appealed to to explain why an object has a certain property. Howling at moons is “natural” to Fido, in that he is of a kind, or has a nature which howling at moons specifies in part what being of that nature means.
If this is correct then, the question sometimes posed in regards to reasons, “How could the fact that he’s a father, by itself, constitute a reason to act or be a certain way?” may be answered. Like with Fido, the fact that an object is of a certain kind, by itself, constitutes a reason for the object to have an attribute when being of that kind is constituted in part by that attribute. To parallel meaning, because bachelor means unmarried man, it makes sense when asked, “Why does the fact that the ‘Tom is a bachelor’, by itself, constitute a reason to believe ‘Tom is unmarried’?” to respond, “That’s just what it means in part when we say something is a bachelor”.
Now, perhaps we may count the proposition “howling at the moon is essential to being a dog” as a belief in addition to the belief that “Fido is a dog” when considering if it is the belief “Fido is a dog” by itself that suggests there is reason for Fido to howl at the moon. However, given that howling at the moon is extending our understanding of being a dog in the same way that knowing what unmarried and man means extends our understanding of the word bachelor, we might think that the belief howling at the moon is essential to being a dog is already accounted for when we say someone believes Fido is a dog. To say that howling at the moon is essential to being a dog is to explicate a belief one already has.
So far we have suggested that a kind’s attributes are what in part constitute being of that kind. Given that a kind can be broken into attributes, we can ask what it means for an object to have some attributes of a kind, but not others. Two conceptions of essence emerge at this point. We may hold that an object is only of a kind when the object has all attributes which are constitutive of being of that kind. Or we might not hold this. Alternatively, an object being of a kind is not a matter of having all of the attributes of that kind, but for some other reason. An object having some attributes of a kind, but not others would make it in some sense “less” of an object of that kind than perhaps other objects of that kind which possesses more attributes. We will deem the former conception the “strong” essence position, and the later the “weak” essence position.
The strong position may appear at first the more plausible position. For the terms ‘essential’ and ‘necessary’ are often substituted freely in everyday conversation, and if a property is necessary to a kind, then in any situation where there is the kind, there is the property. Under the strong conception, if an object is of some kind, then the object must have the properties essential to the kind, for the object would not be of the kind if the object lacked the essential properties. As such, in any possible world where the kind exists, any member of the kind will have the property. So, essential properties are also properties necessary to being of the kind under the strong position. Fine himself seems sympathetic to this view, as he suggests that essence be taken as a finer grade of necessity, and holds that if P(a) is essential to K(a), then P(a) is necessary for K(a).
Give the tendency to substitute ‘necessary’ for ‘essential’, the weak position may not even seem plausible at first. If we allow at this point that essence might possibly not imply necessity though, we can consider the weak position more. Now, the strong position holds that an object must have all attributes of a kind to be of that kind. This claim is not established by any argument however. As argued above, the necessity implied by essence flows from the condition that an object must have all properties essential to a kind to be of the kind. This is just the condition that the weak position rejects. Allowing essence to not imply necessity, we might ask if it makes sense for an object to be of a kind, yet not fully manifest the details of being that make up the kind. This would mean that an object having properties essential to a kind does not imply that the object is of that kind, and that when an object is of a kind, the object might not have all properties essential to the kind.
More concretely, the weak position suggests that the question “What is it to be human”, is answered by specifying the kind human’s essential properties, but the additional question “When is an object a human?” is not determinately answered by looking for objects with those properties. Whether we can come up with a process of identifying essential properties is of no consequence to understanding what essential properties are. We could have an understanding of what makes a property essential, yet not know which properties in the world are essential.
The weak position is conceivable and ultimately, given certain considerations, more plausible than the strong position. For the strong position is too strict with when an object is of a kind, and from this strictness cuts out many properties which at least seem related to being of a kind, yet are too variable in objects of a kind for the properties to meet the strong positions criteria.
That the strong position is too strict is evident when considering things that are broken. For the strong position entails that no object can be broken in a way that matters to object’s being. Recall that the strong position holds that if an attribute is essential to a kind, then an object not having that attribute entails that object not being of that kind. Assuming popping up the finished toast is in part what it is to be a toaster, then Tim the toaster cannot fail to pop up while being a toaster. In other words, either Tim pops up, or Tim is not a toaster. This creates a problem for the strong position regarding the existence of broken toasters, in that under the strong position, no broken toasters exist. This clashes with the way we commonly think, for in ordinary conversations, we talk of broken toasters as things that exist.
Now, to be a broken toaster is to be a toaster and be broken. If an objects is either not a toaster, nor is broken, then that object is not a broken toaster. So, for Tim to be a broken toaster, Tim must at the same time be broken and a toaster. If Tim fails to pop up, he may be broken, but under the strong position Tim is not a toaster. Tim is something else, perhaps a pile of junk, or random things in close proximity. Therefore, if Tim is to be a broken toaster under the strong conception, Tim must be broken in some other way.
Whatever it is about Tim that makes Tim broken cannot be something essential to toasters under the strong position though, for the same form of argument as above could be given. This means that whatever it is about Tim that makes Tim broken has nothing to with what it is about Tim that makes Tim a toaster. Let’s suppose being blue is not essential to being a toaster. Under the strong position, questions as to whether Tim is blue or not would ultimately determine if Tim is a broken toaster or not. This is strange. If a repairman were to say, “I’ve found the problem with your toaster sir, it’s blue,” we would rightly want to know what being blue has to do with the toaster’s failure to make toast.
The strong position thus has difficulties even with saying what it is to be broken. For an object being broken seems to require the object to be of some kind, such that the object is a broken something. Further whatever it is about the object that makes it broken must in some sense matter to being that kind. Under the strong position then, no object can be broken in a meaningful way, as an object cannot be of a kind if the object lacks a property essential to the kind. However, properties essential to the kind seem to be those that in an important sense matter to being the kind, and thus are the properties which having or not having determines brokenness in an object, among perhaps other things.
This may lead the strong position to reject the assumption that popping up is essential to being a toaster. The problem with rejecting the assumption is that it leads to rejection of other like assumptions, such as heating toast being essential to a toaster, suggestions which may like the meaning of man in bachelor, constitute in part what it is to be a toaster. The strong position then seeks only attributes which the object could not fail to have while being of the kind. The rejection of other attributes cuts out a large part of the details of being of some kind in order to isolate attributes which meet the strong position’s criteria, details which prima facia do seem relevant with being of kind. Akin to meaning, the strong position is like someone who refuses to accept that “unmarried” and “man” can be part of the meaning of bachelor understood separately, and must be understood as “unmarried man”.
The weak position avoids these arguments because an object can both be a toaster and fail to pop up at the same time. The weak position even suggests an analysis of being broken. When an object is broken, the object fails to have a property essential to being of a kind the object is. This is possible under the weak position for a kind may still obtain to an object despite a failure of the object to have a property essential to the kind. This means though that having an attribute of a kind is not necessary for members of the kind. As such, a property being essential does not imply that the property is necessary for an object of the relevant kind.
Now, in giving up essence’s implication of necessity, we may appear to give up the use essentialists want the term to have. As such, we might question what is so important about essence if it does not imply necessity. To this we can point out how our understanding of certain other concepts can be improved through taking up the weak position. For instance, the concept of alienation requires that a person is supposed to be a certain way that an alienating object or practice prevents the person from realizing. The weak concept of essence provides a reason to say that the person is supposed to be a certain way while at the same time not being that way. For perhaps reflectively thinking may be essential to being human, and George may be a human, yet not have time to think reflectively due to an overly strong work load. The work load can be described as alienating George from his humanity in that the work load prevents George from fully realizing aspects of his being.
Further, even under the weak position, essence can provide a sense of necessity. As stated earlier, we use the fact that an object has a certain nature, or is of a certain kind, to explain why the object is as it is. When an object of some nature has an attribute of that nature, we take having that nature to be an explanation of why the object has that attribute. As such, when an object has a property essential to its nature, the nature is taken as the cause of the object having that property, in that having the property is explained by having the nature. In other words, when an object of a kind has a property essential to the kind, the property is not considered to come about randomly or by chance, but through the object having that nature.
Now, given that having a nature explains why an object has an essential property, we might hold that an essential property of a kind must come about in an object of the kind if nothing interferes with the object. In this way, how a nature “causes” an object to be a certain way is much like Anscombe’s account of necessitating causes. Anscombe writes “A cause C is a necessitating cause of effect E on the occasions when if C occurs, C is certain to cause E unless something prevents it.” Here, the cause is not a law of nature, but simply a nature. An object being of a nature will necessarily cause the object to be or do E, unless something prevents the object from being E. As such, essential properties are necessary to an object of some kind in worlds where nothing prevents the kind’s attributes from being.
Anscombe later writes that giving an account of “interference” will be of philosophical importance to her account, and the weak position on essence has the recourses to provide an account. Interference, deviation, or something preventing an effect from coming about despite a cause, can be understood as a force outside of the kind in question acting upon the object. By “outside” of the kind, we mean not an attribute of the kind. Given that multiple natures exist, we can understand how an object may be interfered on, yet the interference is also caused. Assuming that some actions, events, etc are essential to a kind, the actions, events, etc of an object of that kind are natural for that kind when they match the kind’s attributes. Actions, movements, events, etc that are not of the kind made by an object are not explainable through appeal to the kind’s essence, and must be explained by a non-kind source if they are explainable. If these actions are explainable, then their explanation is by what “interferes” with the object’s kind’s natural behavior.
At least two major concerns with the weak position remain. First, the account of kinds and natures expressed here is limited, and does not say much about their metaphysical status. Being a toaster seems different than being dog in that we invent toasters, and in some sense determine what being a toaster is constituted by. What constitutes being a dog is something that we seem to discover through watching members of the kind behave. How dog and toaster can both be kinds, yet such a distinction in being be maintained is a matter for further research.
Second, under the strong position, we had a relatively clear understanding of how to determine if a property was essential or not. How do we know we have a strong essential property? A Descartes inspired process would be to imagine removing properties from a kind. Call this kind H. Properties which could be removed from an object while allowing it to be of H are not essential, while properties which removed from the object change it kind to not H are essential to H.
Now, this does require that we know when an object is of a kind or not, a point which the weak position might challenge. The problem with this method is that it relies on our ability to know when an object is of some kind or not. If there is disagreement about whether an object having certain properties makes it a member if a kind or not, then considering which properties can be removed while kindship remains is not helpful, for it relies on an already full understanding of the kind, where no such understanding is had in this situation.
Under the weak position though, determining what a kind’s essential properties are seems even harder, for an object may or may not have a property essential to a kind, yet still be of the kind. Thus, nothing about how an object is seems to determine how the object is supposed to be given the object’s kind. The worry thus is that under the weak position, knowing that a property is essential to some kind is impossible.
The tie between essence and explanation allows this difficulty to be overcome. For an object being of a kind explains why the object has an attribute of the kind in cases where nothing prevents the attribute from coming about. If there is nothing that prevents an attribute from coming about in an object though, the commitment to kindhood explaining attribution would require us to reject either the object being of the kind, or the property being essential. In other words, given that under the weak position essential properties are necessary in worlds with no interference, a property being essential to a kind and not existing in a member of the kind in such world is not possible.
As such, under the weak conception of essence, we hypothesize or make a supposition that a property is essential to some kind, thereby committing ourselves to the existence of interfering forces in cases where a property fails to exist in an object of that kind, and test that hypothesis. If the absence of the supposed essential property in any member of a kind occurs, and is unexplainable in terms of something else preventing it, then either the object is not actually of that kind, or the property is not essential. Further, this method does not involve merely imagining the object without a property, but actual investigation of objects of some kind, and other forces or kinds that can potentially interfere with the objects. If we think having a tail is essential to being a dog, then we must be prepared to explain why Fido, Rover, Lassie, and any other dog are missing tails. For while our hypothesis explains why any dog will have a tail in the right circumstances, only one case of a dog missing a tail without interference will defeat the hypothesis. The process of eliminating bad hypothesis helps single out the good hypothesis. Given that essence accounts for what it is for an object to be of some kind, this suggests that our knowledge of being some kind grows through our interaction with objects of that kind.
Given that our knowledge of when a property is essential to some kind changes through interactions with actual objects of that kind, we understand toasters better when we find what makes them break. Our knowledge of dogs starts out limited; we see a dog and have limited knowledge of what it is to be a dog. Only after we observe how dogs behave in many circumstances, and make theories about when their behavior is normal or interfered upon in a circumstance, do we really get a full understanding of what it is to be a dog. This process begins to look less and less like philosophy however, and more like science. The idea of giving a real definition involves the “real” perhaps more than we initially accounted for. For if the considerations above hold, then actually determining what properties are essential is of interests to both philosophers and scientists, though perhaps more properly answered by the latter.
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