Response To Brian

Brian, in his response to Irwin’s article, argues that Irwin has erroneously associated “acting for the sake of an ultimate good” with “acting for the sake of happiness”. He does this by explaining how a human’s actions and a human should not be thought of as acting for the sake of the same thing; the human’s actions are for the sake of the something, but the human is “...for the sake of something else- “the function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with, or not without, rational principle.”” He then offers an alternate interpretation, in which human’s final cause is being rational, and happiness is the motivation for acting as a human.

My objection to Brian is that the “ultimate good” for humans should be considered as simply being an excellently functioning human. This explains why reason is required, for reason is the unique to humans. Note that here ultimate goodness is relative to a creature. In his footnote, Brian claims that if the ultimate good is rationality, then only humans can be good. This would be true if the ultimate good were the same for all beings. This does not seem to be the case in Aristotle. Since each creature has its own distinctive characteristics and end, each creature will have its own ultimate good. So, the ultimate good of a fish is different than the ultimate good of a cow. If acting in the ultimately good way a creature can act is happiness, then this explanation explains why a cow and a fish might be happy under different circumstances; it is not part of the cow’s ultimate good to swim underwater, and the fish is not happy when it is in a field of grass.

I also disagree with Brian’s claim that doing what makes a thing happy will make a thing a good thing. I think that it is the other way around; acting how you should act will make you happy. I think that Brian’s claim is correct in most situations, simply because the things which make you happy are the right type of things you should do. However, I think that there are some cases where you can act in a way that makes you happy, but still not be a good human. For instance, nutrition and sleep make people happy, but if all they did was eat or sleep, or ate and slept to an extreme, these people would not be good humans under Aristotle’s theory, since they are not fulfilling all their functions as humans.

I haven’t really argued for my position much though, and most of it relies on my intuitions. One textual reference that supports my view is Aristotle’s definition of happiness. According to Aristotle, “Happiness is the activity of the soul exhibiting excellence, and if there is more than one excellence, in accordance with the best and most complete.” (1.7) By ‘exhibiting excellence’, Aristotle probably means functioning “humanly” well, where functioning humanly primarily involves reasoning and using language. Thus, the happiness of a human consists in its soul acting in accordance to the best and most complete human function. Another consideration is that, generally, Aristotle seeks the good of a thing by examining the specific results it has. For example, the good of strategy is winning wars, and the good of medicine is producing health. While I agree that these are actions, and there is a difference between arts and humans, I think that the “good of” strategy can be applied to humans. Thus, in looking as to what the good of humans is, we should look at the unique thing they can produce. As humans are the only rational animals, humans are the only things that can reason. So, reason is unique to humans, and if it is the most excellent thing produced (I think it is for Aristotle, as reason/philosophy has no end other than itself, so is an end in itself) is the only, the ultimate good of humans. Thus, I think my view is prima facia justified.